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Firms’ Listing Choices and their Capital Market Consequences 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines whether the current reporting and disclosure requirements for 
foreign registrants in the United States affect foreign firms’ decisions to list on a U.S. 
exchange.  We find that while firms from a weak disclosure environment are more likely 
to cross-list and either trade over-the-counter or be placed privately among institutional 
investors, they are less likely to list on an exchange in which firms are required to comply 
with U.S. GAAP.  This is consistent with the idea that the decrease in the potential 
private control benefits accruing to managers discourages them from listing on an 
organized exchange.  We further conduct pricing tests to investigate whether the choice 
relating to the mode of listing has capital market consequences.  These tests indicate that: 
(1) exchange-listing firms receive a higher valuation (i.e., Tobin’s q) than non-exchange-
listing firms; and (2) exchange-listing firms domiciled in a higher disclosure regime, who 
incur lower costs of U.S. GAAP compliance, generally receive a higher valuation than 
exchange-listing firms from a lower-disclosure regime.  Overall, the lower tendency of 
firms domiciled in a lower disclosure regime to list on an organized exchange appears to 
be consistent with the smaller valuation benefit they receive from the listing.                   
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1. Introduction  
  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the U.S. disclosure requirements 
for foreign registrants drive firms’ listing choices and whether such choice has capital 
market consequences.  The bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) 
suggests that firms voluntarily choose to list (i.e., bond) in the United States because a 
U.S. listing enhances investor protection and reduces agency costs (see also Ball 2001; 
Stulz 1999; Reese and Weisbach 2002).1  As a consequence, bonding increases the public 
value of their shares by lowering cost of capital due to an increased shareholder base, 
increasing stock liquidity and growth opportunities, and improving reputation and 
visibility (the public value benefit perspective).   
However, critics of the bonding hypothesis (e.g., Licht 2003) argue that managers 
in weak protection countries might be reluctant to cross-list in the United States because 
of the potential loss of private benefits (the private control benefits perspective).  This 
agency theory perspective is consistent with the notion of “signaling-not-bonding,” which 
suggests that better firms signal their business quality by listing in the United States and 
joining their peers there, without much corporate governance improvement (e.g., Siegel 
2005).      
Consistent with the private control benefit view, Doidge et al. (2004) document 
that: (1) firms domiciled in a jurisdiction where investor protection is stronger are more 
likely to bond because the cross-listing cost is likely to be lower; and (2) there is a cross- 
                                                          
1
 Coffee (2002) defines bonding as the costs or liabilities an agent or entrepreneur will incur in order to 
increase stock price by assuring investors that it will perform its duties as promised.  He argues that it is the 
mechanism by which firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority shareholders 
voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stronger investor protection in order to 
attract investors who would otherwise discount stocks with high information risk related to poor disclosure 
and risk of expropriation from minority shareholders.  
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listing premium - Tobin’s q for cross-listed firms is higher than for non-cross-listed firms.  
However, they do not find clear support for the private control benefit hypothesis with 
respect to the improved disclosure requirements at the cross-listing level.  Given that 
some cross-listing firms are required to comply with U.S. disclosure requirements (i.e., 
firms that choose to list on an organized exchange), the potential loss of private control 
benefits due to the higher disclosure level can be a concern to these firms.   
Our research is further motivated by Leuz (2003), who argues that the main 
source of cross-listing benefits is not obvious and that the net benefit of bonding is 
difficult to assess.  In particular, he notes that it is not clear whether the cross-listing 
effect associated with an improvement in the firm’s information environment (which will 
increase firm value) derives from increased disclosure and/or stronger Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement.  He thus claims that studies that exploit the 
cross-sectional variation in cross-listing effects are likely to add value to the literature.  
In this study, we test the private control benefit hypothesis by focusing on the fact 
that only exchange-listing firms incur the cost of complying with the accounting and 
disclosure rules and regulations in the United States.  Meanwhile, cross-listing firms that 
trade over-the-counter as pink sheets or that are placed directly to qualified institutional 
investors (i.e., Rule 144a) need not incur such costs.2  From a manager’s perspective, 
committing to the U.S. disclosure requirements can be costly for two reasons: first, they 
might give up private control benefits by increasing disclosure (especially disclosure of 
sensitive corporate governance-related information); and second, they have to commit the 
firm’s resources to comply with U.S. GAAP, a process which is known to be costly (e.g., 
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Biddle and Saudagaran 1989, Saudagaran and Biddle 1992).3  We also examine the 
valuation (i.e., Tobin’s q) effect of firms’ listing choices in order to assess the benefit 
aspect of firms’ listing decisions.   
There is a systematic variation in reporting requirements among firms cross-
listing in the United States.  Current U.S. regulatory standards demand that foreign firms 
choosing to cross-list in the United States and publicly trade on major exchanges, i.e., 
Level II and Level III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), comply with U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) either by filing item 17 (partial 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP) or item 18 (full reconciliation by filing a 10-K report) of 
the 20-F reconciliation.4,5  In contrast, foreign firms that enter the U.S. market and trade 
in the over-the-counter market as “pink sheets” or have limited secondary trading under 
Rule 144a do not need to comply with U.S. GAAP because of the 1934 Act’s exemption 
under Rule 12g3-2(b) for unlisted companies that furnish home country information to 
the SEC.6  
                                                                                                                                                                             
2
 While firms that list on OTC Bulletin Board are required to reconcile with U.S. GAAP as of 1998, our 
sample does not contain such firms due to our sample selection criteria.  For reference, there were only six 
ADRs on the Bulletin Board in 1998. 
3
 Choi and Stonehill (1982) document that a first-time registration with the SEC cost $400,000 - $1,000,000 
in accounting, legal, printing, and registration fees.  They further note that listing costs on the NYSE 
typically amount to less than $50,000 initially with a modest annual fee thereafter and that these costs are 
much less for AMEX and NASDAQ firms, suggesting that the listing fee is relatively minor compared with 
the cost of meeting financial disclosure requirements.  
4
 Exceptions are Canadian and Israeli firms that list directly, a few Dutch firms that list as New York 
Registry Shares, and a handful of European companies that list directly as Global Registered Shares.  
However, ADR has been by far the most popular mode of listing for foreign firms: as of December 31, 
1999, approximately 96% of foreign firms listed in the United States were ADRs (Citibank 2000). 
5
 These requirements for Level II and III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are often justified by the 
presumption that non-U.S. accounting and disclosure standards are not as stringent as U.S. GAAP. For 
instance, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has claimed that international standard-setters 
have not taken all the necessary measures to stop reserve-accounting abuses that are argued to be common 
in countries such as France, Italy, Sweden, and Germany (e.g., AICPA 1994). 
6
 Regardless of whether securities must be registered, the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 make it illegal to 
commit fraud in conjunction with the sale of securities in the United States.  A defrauded investor can sue 
for recovery under the 1934 Act.  A recent example is the Roche Holdings case in 2002, where their Level I 
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A summary of our results is as follows. Consistent with prior studies, we 
document that firms from a stronger investor protection environment are more likely to 
cross-list in the United States.  In support of the private control benefit hypothesis, our 
results further suggest that cross-listed firms that come from a lower disclosure regime 
are less likely to register on an organized exchange and comply with US GAAP.  Instead, 
they prefer to trade over-the-counter as a pink sheet or to be placed directly to qualified 
institutional investors.  After controlling for self-selection, we find that exchange-listing 
firms receive a higher valuation than other cross-listed firms that do not list on an 
organized exchange.  Our evidence further shows that exchange-listing firms from a 
lower disclosure regime (who incur higher costs of U.S. GAAP compliance) receive a 
lower valuation premium than exchange-listing firms from a higher disclosure regime. 
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways.  First, we 
attempt to address both the cost and the benefit aspects of U.S. cross-listings. Unlike the 
bonding argument, which focuses on cross-listing benefits, the private control benefit 
hypothesis mainly relates to the opportunity costs of giving up those benefits. Another 
contribution of this study is in isolating the disclosure effect of U.S. cross-listing from its 
investor rights effects. For instance, firms from weaker disclosure regimes are more 
likely to cross-list but not on exchanges whereas firms from stronger disclosure regimes 
are more likely to exchange-list. Further, firms with stronger investor protection are more 
likely to cross-list on exchanges. 
Our results suggest that managers’ private control benefit concerns drive firms’ 
bonding decisions at both overall cross-listing and exchange-listing levels. At the cross-
                                                                                                                                                                             
ADR investors had a class action lawsuit launched against the company for material misstatements (Prime 
Zone Media Network, Inc., May 31, 2002).   
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listing level, we find, consistent with Doidge et al. (2004), that firms from weaker 
(stronger) investor protection countries are less (more) likely to cross-list in the United 
States. At the exchange-listing level, our evidence indicates that firms from weaker 
(stronger) disclosure environments are less (more) likely to list on an organized exchange 
and comply with U.S. GAAP, suggesting that managers in weaker disclosure 
environments are more reluctant to improve disclosure transparency and expose 
their control benefits to public scrutiny.     
We also find that while there is a valuation benefit from cross-listing on an 
organized exchange with mandated high disclosures, the benefit is (larger) for firms 
domiciled in a jurisdiction with relatively lower (higher) disclosure level, while it is more 
(less) costly for firms domiciled in a jurisdiction with lower (higher) disclosure level to 
list on an organized exchange.  This result suggests that home country disclosure 
practices of cross-listing firms matter to investors even after they subject themselves to 
U.S. accounting rules and regulations (e.g., Chan and Seow 1996).  To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to document that the benefit of listing varies systematically among 
cross-listing firms, lending support to Coffee’s (2002) arguments.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  In the next section, we 
describe the background to the issue and develop hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the 
sample and methodology.  Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
 The notion of bonding comes from the law and economics literature where it is 
used to refer to the costs or liabilities an agent or entrepreneur may incur in order to 
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assure investors that (s)he will perform as promised (Coffee 2002).  Coffee (2002) argues 
that bonding can occur either through the courts (legal or liability bonding) or through 
monitoring by reputational intermediaries such as U.S. underwriters, auditors, credit-
rating agencies, equity analysts, and stock exchanges (reputational bonding). 
A number of studies have examined the bonding hypothesis both theoretically and 
empirically (e.g., Stultz 1999, Cantale 1996, Reese and Weisbach 2002, Errunza and 
Miller 2000, Hail and Leuz 2006b).  Stulz (1999) argues that companies from countries 
with poor legal standards can reduce agency costs of external finance by subjecting 
themselves to more stringent standards, and thus lower their cost of capital.  Similarly, 
Cantale (1996) argues that firms signal their quality by listing on strictly regulated 
markets.  Cantale’s (1996) model suggests that companies in countries with less strict 
supervision and lower disclosure levels should be more likely to list abroad. 
Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that equity issues generally increase following 
cross-listings and that the increase is larger for cross-listing firms from countries with 
weaker investor protection.  They also document that non-U.S. firms that list in the 
United States are also subjected to greater scrutiny and monitoring from the press and 
from the investment community, further improving the protection of minority 
shareholders.  Errunza and Miller (2000) document a significant decline in the cost of 
capital around cross-listing, and conclude that financial market liberalizations have 
significant economic benefits.  Berger et al. (2005) find that the stock market reaction to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX hereafter) is more positive for firms from countries with 
weak private enforcement of investor rights, suggesting that SOX improve investor 
protection and hence firm value.  Hail and Leuz (2006a) find that countries with 
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extensive securities and disclosure regulation and strong enforcement mechanisms 
exhibit lower levels of cost of capital than countries with weak legal institutions.                
An underlying assumption in the bonding argument is that increasing shareholder 
protection will affect the public value of the company (the public value benefit 
hypothesis).  Reese and Weisbach (2002) notes that this effect can take place in two 
ways.  First, decrease in expected private benefits from increased shareholder protection 
will increase the value of the firm’s public stock directly because it will lower expected 
wealth transfers to managers out of current cash flows.  Second, to the extent that 
mangers more actively generate and exploit growth opportunities after cross-listing, total 
expected cash flows will increase after the listing (Hail and Leuz 2006b).7  Thus, the 
public value benefit hypothesis predicts that firms domiciled in weaker disclosure 
environments, with greater private control benefits and lower expected future cash flows 
than those with stronger disclosure environments, are more likely to list on an organized 
exchange.  This is because the potential valuation benefit from increased disclosure is 
likely to be greater.  Specifically, the benefit can come from lower costs of capital owing 
to less expropriation risk and higher expected cash flow due to the signaling effect. 
On the other hand, Licht (2003) interprets most of the existing evidence on cross-
listing as being consistent with “avoiding,” not bonding.  In his survey, Licht (2003) 
argues that the role of bonding in the literature has been overstated.  He argues that the 
existing evidence on firms’ cross-listing decisions is consistent with the view that 
managers in weak investor protection countries are reluctant to cross-list in the United 
States because of the loss of potential private benefits.  Siegel (2005) examines whether 
                                                          
7
 Hail and Leuz (2006b) argue that U.S. cross-listings increase investors’ expectations about future cash 
flows by reducing the expropriation of cash flows and expanding firms’ growth opportunities. 
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U.S. laws and regulations deterred insiders of a Mexican firm from engaging in illegal 
asset-taking, and concludes that the SEC might not have been fully effective in enforcing 
the law against U.S.-listed foreign firms.8 
For managers of firms that cross-list in the United States, meeting the U.S. 
disclosure requirements can be costly from an agency theory perspective due to 
disclosure of conflicts of interest.  As Licht (2003) notes, the current U.S. reporting rules 
require that cross-listing firms disclose potentially sensitive corporate governance-related 
information such as aggregate remuneration, related party transaction, stock option-
related information and the names of shareholders known to own more than five percent 
of the issuer’s voting securities.9  Thus, for managers who are concerned about their 
private control benefits, release of such information can reduce their control and thus the 
benefits associated with it.         
Another reason why meeting the U.S. reporting requirements can be costly to the 
managers is the financial burden of complying with such requirements.  For example, 
Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) report that the cost of meeting the U.S. GAAP compliance 
requirement is no less than US$ 1 million per year for a major multinational firm.  
Mittoo’s survey (1992) of managers in 190 Canadian companies that cross-list in the 
United States and the United Kingdom finds that the managers view the main costs of 
cross-listing as: (1) meeting SEC reporting requirements (60.1% of the respondents); (2) 
legal and accounting fees (44.2%); and (3) listing fees (31.7%).10  Managers will be 
                                                          
8
 In contrast, Coffee (1999) argues that U.S. laws and regulations effectively deter malfeasance by foreign 
firm insiders.  
9
 These requirements apply to all 20-F reconciliation filers (i.e., both 20-F item 17 and 20-F item 18 filers). 
10
 Further, more than half of the companies included in the survey by Fanto and Karmel (1997) (i.e., foreign 
companies that had entered the U.S. capital market) complained about the difficulties, expense, and 
unfamiliarity of U.S. accounting and disclosure requirements (including the required Management 
Discussion and Analysis).  
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concerned about the impact of the reconciliation cost on the financial position and public 
value of the company because of their personal financial stake in the firm, as well as the 
extent to which the firm’s performance will affect their human capital value in the 
managerial labor market (e.g., Reese and Weisbach 2002).  However, this reconciliation 
cost argument, while intuitively appealing, is difficult to test empirically.  Among other 
things, these costs are difficult to quantify and they are not available to the public in most 
cases.  As a result, it is hard to determine how economically significant these costs are to 
individual firms and how such financial burden affects firms’ listing decisions and their 
valuations.   
Doidge et al. (2004) hypothesize and find that firms originating from jurisdictions 
with a weaker investor protection mechanism in place are less likely to cross-list in the 
United States because potential loss of private control benefits from cross-listing is likely 
to be larger.  However, they do not find evidence to support the private control benefit 
hypothesis with respect to the financial reporting disclosure level in a firm’s country of 
domicile.  One possible explanation for this result is that while all cross-listing firms are 
subject to U.S. security regulations, which enhance investor protection, they are required 
to conform to the U.S. GAAP only if they list on an organized exchange.   
Given that firms that list on an exchange and comply with U.S. GAAP must 
release sensitive corporate governance-related information, which could potentially 
reduce managers’ private control benefits, we predict that firms that less frequently 
disclose such information in their home country (i.e., firms from weaker disclosure 
environments) will be less inclined to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP.  
This leads us to predict that the disclosure level in cross-listed firms’ country of domicile 
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will be positively related to firms’ decision to list on an organized exchange.  Thus, we 
formulate our first hypothesis as follows:   
 
H1: Cross-listed firms whose home-country disclosure level is higher (lower) 
will be more (less) likely to list on an organized exchange, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
Our next hypothesis investigates whether the disclosure level of exchange-listed 
firms’ country of domicile will affect their valuation.  Examining this relation enables us 
to examine if the market rewards firms that list on an exchange and incur the high costs 
of bonding to the accounting rules and regulations in the United States.   
Prior studies have shown that the cost of capital is associated with disclosure level 
(e.g., Botosan 1997, Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Hail and Leuz 2006b).  While one would 
expect that firms’ cost of capital would, on average, decrease after bonding to stricter 
accounting and reporting standards by complying with U.S. GAAP, it is not obvious 
whether the valuation will be associated with the disclosure level in the firm’s country of 
domicile.  For instance, while Doidge et al. (2004) report that (1) non-U.S. firms cross-
listed in the United States on average receive a higher valuation than non-U.S. firms that 
are not cross-listed in the United States, and that (2) among the firms cross-listed in the 
United States, firms that list on an organized exchange receive a higher valuation than 
firms that do not list on an organized exchange, no prior study examines whether firms’ 
home-country disclosure level affects valuation of firms cross-listed in the United 
States.11   
On one hand, it is possible that firms from a higher (lower) disclosure regime 
receive a higher (lower) valuation if investors refer to accounting figures based on firms’ 
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home-country GAAP to value firms.  For instance, Chan and Seow (1996) find that 
earnings prepared under firms’ home-country GAAP are value-relevant to U.S. investors 
and that they are even more value-relevant than U.S. GAAP-based accounting 
information.12  Similarly, Lang et al. (2006) suggest that the reconciled earnings for firm 
cross-listed in the United States are of lower quality than U.S. GAAP earnings for U.S. 
firms.  Thus, if U.S. investors largely disregard reconciled U.S. GAAP earnings and rely  
more on home-country GAAP information to value firms, it is possible that the level of 
the required cost of equity capital is associated with the disclosure level in the cross-
listing firms’ country of domicile.  Under this scenario, cross-listing firms from a higher 
disclosure regime could receive a higher valuation due to the higher disclosure level in 
their home country.13    
On the other hand, one might not observe any systematic differences in valuations 
among the exchange-listing firms if investors largely disregard the home country GAAP 
accounting numbers provided by firms that comply with U.S. GAAP.  In other words, if 
investors primarily use the U.S. GAAP accounting information to value firms, one might 
not observe a valuation premium difference as the disclosure level difference among 
firms that comply with U.S. GAAP will be negligible.  Since the direction of association 
between the disclosure level in firms’ country of domicile and firm values is not obvious, 
we state our second hypothesis in the null form as:     
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11
 Hail and Leuz (2006) partially address this issue by examining the association between cross-listing 
firms’ home country disclosure level and the cost of capital.  
12
 In contrast, Amir et al. (1993) find that U.S. GAAP reconciliations of firms’ home country GAAP 
accounting numbers are value-relevant.  Under this view, one might not observe a difference in valuation, 
assuming that investors value firms mostly based on their U.S. GAAP earnings. 
13
 Another possibility is that investors are not fully aware of the fact that exchange-listing firms must 
commit to an increased level of disclosure. 
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H2: There is no systematic difference in valuations between exchange-listing 
firms from a higher disclosure regime and exchange-listing firms from a 
lower disclosure regime.14         
  
 
3. Sample and Univariate Analysis  
 
We obtain our initial sample firms from and use data on the firms in the Global 
Vantage database for the year 2000.  Of 14,787 non-US firms for which 2000 financial 
data are available in the database, we exclude 5,137 firms that have total assets less than 
U.S. $100 million to make our sample firms comparable across countries and to the 
sample of Doidge et al. (2004) which used the same size cutoff in the sample selection.15   
We further lose 2,538 firms for which data are not available for firm-level control 
variables. We then check the cross-listing status of those firms in the United States as of 
December 31, 2000, using the Bank of New York Global Equity Investing Depositary 
Receipt Service list. 
Next, we use the 1995 disclosure index produced by the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR hereafter) to proxy for the extent of home 
country accounting disclosure, which is known to explain firms’ cross-listing behaviors 
(see, e.g., Pagano et al. 2002; Doidge et al. 2004).16,17  To make our results closely 
comparable to those of previous studies, (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004), we associate a firm’s 
                                                          
14
 Following the extant literature (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004), we use Tobin’s q as the measure of valuation 
premium in this study.   
15
 Among the 5,137 firms excluded, 168 firms are cross-listed. When we perform all empirical analyses 
using firms with total assets of $10 million or higher, the key results are qualitatively the same. 
16
 The CIFAR index, which has been used extensively in recent research, rates the annual reports of 1,000 
leading companies from 41 countries for their inclusion and exclusion of 85 items (see Hope 2003 for 
extensive validity tests of the CIFAR index and further references). 
17
 A potential issue with using the country-level CIFAR scores is that these scores may be affected by firms 
that are cross-listed in the United States.  This effect might be especially large for countries with few firms 
represented in the CIFAR sample.  Using very detailed data on all firms included in the CIFAR sample 
(based on Hope 2003), we have re-recomputed country-average disclosure scores excluding firms that are 
cross-listed in the United States. Inferences are not affected when using these adjusted scores rather than 
the raw CIFAR scores (results available from the authors). 
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choice of cross-listing with investor protection proxies, including anti-director rights, 
judicial efficiency, and legal origin, and other variables representing firm-level 
characteristics.   
The inclusion of investor protection proxies are based on La Porta et al. (1998), 
who show that: (1) investor protection tends to be stronger in common law regimes than 
in code law regimes; (2) that investor protection is higher when the judicial system is  
more efficient and when anti-director rights are higher18; and (3) that the quality of 
investor protection is positively related to stock market development (captured by the 
liquidity of the firm’s home stock market).  We exclude 914 firms from countries that do 
not have CIFAR disclosure scores or do not have La Porta et al. scores for anti-director 
rights and judicial efficiency.  
 
[Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here] 
 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure described above.  Our sample 
represents firms from 36 different countries (see Table 2).  Among our 6,198 sample 
firms, 269 firms were listed on one of the major stock exchanges in the United States, 
475 firms were traded over-the-counter (OTC) or under Rule 144a/Regulation S, and 
5,454 firms were not cross-listed in the United States.  Table 2 summarizes country 
distributions of sample firms by listing mode.  Our test and control variables are defined 
in Table 3. 
 
                                                          
18
 The anti-director index aggregates six different shareholder rights: (1) the right of shareholders to mail 
their proxy; (2) the right of shareholders not to have to deposit shares ahead of the shareholder meeting; (3) 
cumulative voting of minority shareholders on the board of directors; (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism in place; (5) the right of shareholders who represent less than 10% of share capital to call an 
extraordinary meeting; and (6) preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholder’s vote.  Judicial 
efficiency measures the degree of effectiveness of legal system on a scale of one (low) to ten (high). 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The country-level variables used in our analyses are tabulated in Table 4.  In 
Panel A, we report the CIFAR disclosure scores, enforcement effectiveness measures 
(anti-director rights and judicial efficiency), legal origin, liquidity ratio, and the gross 
national product.  In Panel B of Table 4 we report the means and medians of the  
regression variables separately for cross-listed and non cross-listed firms and compare the 
differences between the two groups of firms.  Consistent with Doidge et al. (2004), we 
find that cross-listing firms have lower home-country disclosure levels relative to non 
cross-listing firms (see Panel B of Table 4).  The mean disclosure score for cross-listing 
firms is 72.25 while the score is 72.99 for non cross-listing firms.  The mean difference is 
statistically significant (p<0.05), but rather small. 
In addition, the mean and the median comparisons show that firms domiciled in 
countries with a higher Log_GNP are less likely to cross-list and that cross-listing firms 
tend to be larger than non cross-listing ones.  Cross-listing firms are growth firms that are 
more profitable, are more leveraged, and have higher capital intensity than non cross-
listing firms.  The cross-listing firms issue more debt and more equity. 
Next, Panel C of Table 4 shows that, both the mean and median disclosure scores 
are higher for the exchange-listed cross-listing firms than for the cross-listed firms that do 
not list on an organized exchange.  Combined with the results in Panel B, the results in 
Panel C of Table 4 provide univariate support for the private control benefit hypothesis.  
That is, while firms domiciled in a lower disclosure regime are more likely to cross-list 
relative to firms originating from a higher disclosure regime, they tend to avoid listing on 
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an exchange where U.S. GAAP compliance is required.19  The mean disclosure score for 
exchange-listing firms is 74.7, higher than that for non-exchange-listing firms (70.9).  
The difference is statistically significant at p<0.01.  This difference is more noticeable 
and larger than the disclosure score difference between cross-listing vs. non-cross-listing 
firms.  Further comparisons show that the exchange-listing firms are larger firms with 
higher profitability and growth.  They also issue more equity, and are more likely to meet 
the minimum quantitative listing requirements of NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX than non 
exchange-listing firms.20  The correlation matrix reported in Panel D of Table 4 shows 
that disclosure level is positively correlated with anti-director rights and judicial 
efficiency (p<0.01).  Further, the investor protection measures (i.e., anti-director rights 
and judicial efficiency) correlate highly with each other (p<0.01). 
 
4. Methodology and Multivariate Results  
 
 
 Cross-listing choice 
 
Before testing our hypotheses, we first replicate Doidge et al. (2004)’s cross-
listing model in order to ensure the comparability of our sample with theirs.  The 
regression variables are described in detail in Table 3.21  Given the high correlation 
between the investor protection measures, including these measures separately into the 
                                                          
19
 In our sample, approximately 13% of the firms domiciled in a lower disclosure regime (i.e., firms 
domiciled in a country that has a below median CIFAR score) cross-list outside an organized exchange 
(i.e., either trade over-the-counter or trade as 144a), compared to about 8% of firms domiciled in a higher 
disclosure regime.    
20
 Each stock exchange requires a different set of quantitative listing requirements. For example, the listing 
standards for non-U.S. firms on the NYSE include: 5,000 worldwide shareholders, 2.5 million worldwide 
publicly held shares, $100 million worldwide public market value, and aggregate three-year pre-tax 
earnings of $100 million together with a minimum of $25 million in earnings in each of the two most recent 
years.  More detailed information on the listing requirements of the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX is 
available from “Depository Receipts – An Information Guide,” published by Citibank in 2000. 
21
 In order to mitigate the impact of statistical outliers, we winsorize extreme values of all firm-level 
variables that fall in the top and bottom 1% of the pooled distribution. 
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regression model will create collinearity, making an interpretation of the coefficients 
difficult.  To circumvent this issue, we use factor analysis to form a composite measure 
of investor protection, which we label as Investor_rights_factor, to capture the effects of 
investor protection in an economy.    
We expect that disclosure level will be an important determinant of firms’ listing  
(both cross-listing and exchange-listing) choices primarily because the disclosure 
requirement is one of the most significant differences between exchange-listing and non-
exchange-listing firms.  For instance, while all cross-listing firms are subject to the 
benefits of bonding and monitoring to some extent (e.g., being subject to greater scrutiny 
and monitoring from the press and from investor community), both the benefit and the 
cost of increased disclosure exist only for exchange-listing firms.     
We include legal origin dummies in order to enhance the comparability of our 
findings to those of prior studies (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004).  We also include several firm 
characteristics that have been identified by previous studies as determinants of cross-
listing in order to control for firm-level demands for capital.  They are firm size, capital 
intensity, financial leverage, asset turnover, issuance of debt and equity, and industry 
membership.22   
In the logit model (equation (1)) below, the dependent variable XLIST is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm cross-lists in the United States, 
and zero otherwise.  Based on Doidge et al. (2004), we predict a negative sign for 
Disclosure and a positive sign for Investor_rights_factor.   
                                                          
22
 Industry membership is classified according to the SIC code in the following manner: Agriculture & food (0100-
0999 and 2000-2111), Mining & construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), Textiles & printing/publishing 
(2200-2799), Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899), Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399), 
Durable manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), Transportation (4000-4899), Utilities 
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XLIST = = 0 + 1 Disclosure + 2 Investor_rights_factor + 3 F_Law + 4 G_Law  
+ 5 S_Law + 6 Liquidity_R + 7 Log_GNP  
+ 8 Size + 9 Cap_Intensity + 10 Leverage + 11 Turnover  
+ 12 Debt_Issue + 13 Equity_Issue + 14 Industry +   (1) 
  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 5.  The coefficient 
on Disclosure is negative and significant (p<0.01) across all four specifications, 
suggesting that firms originating from a lower (higher) disclosure regime are more (less) 
likely to cross-list.  The coefficient on Investor_rights_factor is generally positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms domiciled in a stronger (weaker) investor protection 
regime are more (less) likely to cross-list in the United States, ceteris paribus.  While 
these results are consistent with Doidge et al. (2004), the signs of the two coefficients are 
in the opposite direction and thus they appear to be internally inconsistent.  A potential 
explanation for this inconsistency is that while all cross-listing firms subject themselves 
to the Securities Act of 1934 (and increase investor protection), only cross-listing firms 
on an organized exchange are required to disclose sensitive corporate governance 
information that can jeopardize managers’ private control benefits.  In other words, 
managers of firms from weaker disclosure environments might keep much of the private 
control benefits until they cross-list on a major U.S. exchange and increase disclosure, 
ceteris paribus.23        
                                                                                                                                                                             
(4900-4999), Retail (5000-5999), Banking or financial services (6000-6999), Services (7000-8999 excluding 7370-
7379), and Computers (7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679). 
23
 Our results do not change if we exclude the legal origin dummies.  Our results are also robust to the 
inclusion of corporate governance proxies (e.g., Gompers et al. 2003). 
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The explanatory power (R2) of the model ranges from 5.6% to 38%, depending on 
the specification.  The explanatory power of the model increases sharply when the 
additional control variables are included in the model.  The significant size coefficient 
(p<0.01) is consistent with the notion that since the large fixed component of the costs of 
cross-listing bears more heavily on small companies, large companies are more likely to 
cross-list (Saudagaran 1988).  Overall, our results are directly comparable to previous 
studies.24  
Next, we model and test an exchange-listing model.  The dependent variable in 
this regression, ORG_EXC_XLIST, takes the value of one if a firm cross-lists on an 
organized exchange where the firm is required to conform to U.S. GAAP, and zero 
otherwise.  For this purpose, we examine a sub-sample of firms used in the previous 
model, namely those firms that cross-list in the United States.  In this regression, we 
include a dummy variable, Listing_R, which measures the number of stock exchange 
(i.e., NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) listing requirements a firm is able to meet, in order to 
control for the possibility that the firm’s decision to list on an organized exchange is 
affected by the requirements of the exchange.  Further, we include the legal origin 
dummies to indirectly control for the financial burden of U.S. GAAP compliance.  While 
imperfect, the use of this proxy derives from the notion that common law countries tend 
to have stronger investor protection than code law countries. It suggests that the financial 
burden of U.S. GAAP reconciliation is likely to be smaller for common law countries 
than for code law countries.     
The private control benefit hypothesis predicts a positive sign for Disclosure in 
the following exchange-listing logit model (i.e., equation (2)).  A positive coefficient on 
                                                          
24
 We obtain similar results estimating probit instead of logit models. 
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Disclosure would mean that firms from a higher (lower) disclosure regime are more 
(less) likely to reconcile to U.S. GAAP.  In contrast, the public value benefit hypothesis 
predicts the opposite given that the additional amount of disclosure firms would need to  
 
make is likely to be greater (smaller) and thus the benefit from such increased disclosure 
is likely to be larger (smaller) for firms from a low (high) disclosure regime. 
     
ORG_EXC_XLIST = 0 + 1 Disclosure + 2 Investor_rights_factor + 3 F_Law  
+ 4 G_Law + 5 S_Law + 6 Liquidity_R + 7 Log_GNP  
+ 8 Listing_R + 9 Size + 10 Cap_Intensity + 11 Leverage  
+ 12 Turnover + 13 Debt_Issue + 14 Equity_Issue  
+ 15 Industry +             (2) 
  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 The results from estimating equation (2) are reported in Table 6. The explanatory 
powers of the models range from 17.9% to 32.6%.  Consistent with the private control 
benefit hypothesis and H1, the coefficient on Disclosure is positive and significant in all 
four regression specifications, suggesting that firms with a lower home-country 
disclosure level are less likely to cross-list on an organized exchange, in which case they 
must comply with accounting and reporting regulations.  In contrast, the 
Investor_rights_factor variable becomes insignificant this time and there is no clear 
pattern across the legal origin dummies.25  We interpret this finding as evidence that the 
                                                          
25
 Measuring the cost of reconciliation using the CIFAR index, which is in essence a quantitative measure 
of disclosure, has limitations in that the reconciliation cost will be affected by not only the amount of 
disclosure (what the CIFAR scores measure) but also by the similarity between the home country GAAP 
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agency cost of increasing disclosure in accordance with U.S. GAAP are higher for firms 
originating from a lower disclosure regime and that such costs play an important role in 
explaining firms listing decisions. 26     
 
Control for uneven country representation 
Next, to examine whether our results are driven by an uneven country 
representation of sample firms, we re-estimate both equations (1) and (2) using a 
weighted logit approach, using the number of observations per country as weights.  In 
these regressions, each country is given an equal weight, regardless of how many firms 
from the particular country are actually included in the sample.     
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The results, reported in Table 7, show that our findings are not driven by an 
uneven country representation: there is clear evidence of bonding at the exchange-listing 
level with respect to the disclosure requirements (i.e., the coefficient on Disclosure is 
positive and significant).  While the results are generally consistent with the previous 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and U.S. GAAP.  Thus, we have alternatively used the closeness to U.S. GAAP scores found in Bradshaw 
et al. (2004).  Since these scores measure how similar the home country accounting policies are to U.S. 
GAAP, one could argue that they are better indicators of reconciliation costs.  Untabulated results show 
that our inference is not affected by the inclusion of this variable.  They further show that the closeness to 
U.S. GAAP scores is insignificant when included in the model, lending further support to the private 
control benefit hypothesis.     
26
 We have also conducted a further robustness test on the validity of our disclosure scores.  A potential 
issue regarding the use of the CIFAR scores for our purpose is the extent they capture firm’s disclosure of 
its governance and ownership structures.  To this end, we examine how the CIFAR scores correlate with 
S&P governance and ownership sub-scores.  Our results show that both country-level S&P scores and a set 
of individual governance and ownership scores in the S&P index are strongly correlated with country-level 
CIFAR scores.  The univariate correlations between the CIFAR scores and country-level S&P sub-scores 
(i.e., financial, governance, and ownership) were significant in all cases.  In particular, the correlation 
between the CIFAR scores and the country-level S&P governance (ownership) scores was 0.613 (0.426).  
Further, the three S&P subgroup scores are highly positively correlated, suggesting that firms that disclose 
more financial information are also likely to disclose more governance and ownership information.  In 
addition, our inferences do not change when we re-estimate the listing models in Table 8 after replacing the 
firm-level total S&P disclosure scores with firm-level governance or ownership S&P sub-scores.  
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ones, the Investor_rights_factor coefficient becomes positive and significant in the 
exchange-listing regression, consistent with the idea of bonding.  In other words, we 
observe bonding with respect to both disclosure and investor protection level in firms’ 
country of domicile in the weighted logit models.27        
 
Control for variation in firm-level disclosures  
 
As a robustness check, we replace the country-level CIFAR score with Standard 
and Poors’ (S& P hereafter) 2001 firm-level disclosure scores, and re-estimate both 
cross-listing and exchange-listing models.  Although using the country-level CIFAR 
scores enhances the comparability of our findings with prior studies that have used these 
scores to proxy for disclosure levels (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004), they are not firm-specific 
disclosure measures and were compiled in 1995, which is prior to our sample period.   
However, this advantage is obtained at the cost of having to conduct tests and 
make inferences based on a relatively small sample.  For instance, the extent to which our 
inference is affected by any sample selection bias from adopting this approach is not 
clear.  Thus, we argue that the two approaches (i.e., using country-level vs. firm-level 
disclosure scores) should be viewed as complementing each other.  In this firm-level 
approach, we use 642 (345) sample firms that have an S&P disclosure score available in 
the cross-listing (exchange-listing) model.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
                                                          
27
 The results remain similar if we estimate the models excluding the three most heavily represented 
countries in the sample (i.e., Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom). 
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The results reported in Table 8 indicate that coefficients on both the S&P firm-
level disclosure scores and the investor protection variables have predicted signs in cross-
listing and exchange-listing models.  The coefficient on the Disclosure variable continues  
to be positive and highly significant (p<0.01) in the exchange-listing model.  In the cross-
listing model Disclosure is negative (as before) but not significant.28  The investor 
protection variable is marginally significant (p<0.10) in the cross-listing model, but it is 
insignificant in the exchange-listing model. Taken together, these results alleviate the 
concern that the exchange-listed (non-exchange-listed but cross-listed) firms might be 
driving the previously reported positive (negative) sign for the investor protection 
(disclosure) variable in the cross-listing (exchange-listing) model.          
 
Alignment in time between disclosure scores and sample period 
To alleviate the concern that the measurement of the CIFAR scores is not 
perfectly aligned with our sample period, we carry out several sensitivity tests. First, we 
point out that the disclosure ranking across countries seems fairly stable over time (e.g., 
the correlation between country level CIFAR (1995) and country level S&P (2001) is 
close to 0.70). Second, recently published studies (e.g., Bushman et al. 2004) use the 
CIFAR index. Third, we have replaced the country-level CIFAR with country-level S&P 
scores (which were computed for our sample period) and re-run our regressions. No 
inferences are affected when using the more updated disclosure scores. Fourth, we have 
rerun tests after excluding certain emerging economies that may have experienced 
                                                          
28
 Clearly, there is a trade-off between using the more up-to-date firm-level disclosure index (i.e., S&P) and 
the larger sample size from using country-level CIFAR scores. In other words, it is possible that the 
insignificance of firm-specific disclosure scores in the cross-listing model might have been driven by the 
significantly smaller sample size available for the S&P scores. However, given that our goal is to document 
bonding at the exchange-listing level, not at the cross-listing level, we are not overly concerned about this 
insignificance. 
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improvement in financial disclosure in recent years (i.e., India, Brazil, Chile, and Turkey) 
from our sample and re-estimate the models. Again, our inferences are not affected.  
 
 
Benchmarking on firms that cross-list but do not list on an exchange 
Our results so far suggest that firms from a weak disclosure environment are more 
likely to cross-list but that they are less likely to list on an organized exchange where 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP is required.  A potential explanation for such listing choices 
is that while firms domiciled in weak disclosure environments perceive greater benefit 
from bonding to the U.S. market in terms of increased visibility and reputation, etc., they 
try to reduce the overall cost of achieving this objective.  To shed further light on this 
issue, we use multinomial logit regressions to account for the possibility that firms 
consider alternative cross-listing modes when they make the listing decision.   
In the multinomial logit models, we consider three cross-listing modes: non cross-
listing (NCL), cross-listing but not exchange-listing (CL_NEL) (i.e., traded on OTC/Rule 
144a/ Regulation S), and cross-listing on major exchanges (EL) (i.e., traded on NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ).  We include both firm-level and country-level controls in this 
analysis.  Under this setting, each coefficient captures the extent to which the firm and 
country characteristics affect a firm’s marginal preference of the cross-listing mode 
relative to the CL_NEL: a positive (negative) coefficient implies preference over (for) 
CL_NEL.29   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
                                                          
29
 We repeat the analysis using non cross-listing (NCL) firms as the benchmark. Our inferences do not 
change. 
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The coefficient on Disclosure is positive and significant for both non cross-listing 
(NCL) and exchange-listing (EL) firms (Table 9), which suggests that home-country 
disclosure level affects the probability of choosing non cross-listing (NCL) or exchange 
listing (EL) over cross listing on a non-exchange (CL_NEL).  Specifically, it indicates 
that firms domiciled in a strong disclosure regime are more likely to choose NCL or EL 
over CL_NEL, consistent with our previous findings. The coefficient on 
Investor_rights_factor is significantly negative for NCL, but it becomes insignificant for 
EL.  Both of these results are consistent with Doidge et al. (2004), and they suggest that 
firms from a strong investor protection environment have a higher tendency to cross-list 
than firms domiciled in a weak investor protection regime.  The Size coefficients are 
significantly negative for NCL and significantly positive for EL, consistent with large 
companies being more likely to cross-list and more likely to list on an organized 
exchange. 
Taken together, the multinomial logit regression results are generally consistent 
with our previous results, suggesting that the higher (lower) likelihood of firms from a 
poor disclosure regime cross-listing (exchange-listing) in the United States (relative to 
firms from a strong disclosure environment) might be due to the fact that these firms wish 
to increase their visibility, recognition, and reputation among investors without strictly 
subjecting themselves to the accounting rules and regulations in the United States.30                                   
 
 
                                                          
30
 These results suggest that non-exchange cross-listing (non-cross-listing) might be the best option for 
firms from very weak (moderately strong) disclosure regimes and that exchange-listing might be the best 
option for firms from strong disclosure regimes. They suggest the presence of non-linear relations between 
disclosure and costs as well as benefits. We leave further investigation of this issue to future research. 
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Valuation impact of cross-listing and exchange-listing  
 
In this section, we examine whether the valuation impact of cross-listing and 
exchange-listing choices varies systematically with the disclosure level in firms’ country 
of domicile.  To distinguish lower and higher disclosure regimes, we identify firms with a 
country-level CIFAR score above (below) the median of all country-level CIFAR scores 
as a higher (lower) disclosure regime.  The purpose of this investigation is to examine 
whether firms that exchange-list from a lower disclosure regime, whose cost of meeting 
the reporting rules and regulations is likely to be higher, receive a similar level of 
valuation as those that exchange-list from a higher disclosure regime after the exchange-
listing.31    
To test H2, we estimate the following regression model, which employs Tobin’s q 
as the dependent variable.32  We follow Doidge et al. (2004) closely in modeling the 
Tobin’s q equation, and include several control variables, which are defined in Table 3.  
We examine Tobin’s q rather than either firms’ cost of capital or future realization of 
cash flows because Tobin’s q enables us to examine both the cost of capital effect and the 
cash flow effect of cross-listing jointly.  In order to control for the effects of liquidity on 
firm value, we include a country-level estimate for liquidity.  We control for growth and 
ROA to control for the effects of firm growth and profitability on our valuation measure.  
We also control for global industry q in order to control for the industry effect on q 
globally (Doidge et al. 2004).  
                                                          
31
 An underlying assumption is that there is no material difference in the streams of future cash flows 
between the two groups of firms.  To our knowledge, there is no previous study that addresses this issue. 
32
 We acknowledge that various accounting issues (degree of conservatism, treatment of goodwill, etc.) as 
well as differences in inflation can affect Tobin’s q.  Despite these limitations, it has been widely used in 
this stream of literature (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004).  To control for the possibility that q is influenced by the 
difference in the degree of accounting conservatism across countries, we include the conservatism score in 
Bushman and Piotroski (2005) and re-estimate the model.  The results do not change.   
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Tobin’s q  = 0 + 1 XLIST + 2 ORG_EXC_XLIST + 3 Low_Disclosure  
+ 4 XLIST*Low_Disclosure + 5 ORG_EXC_XLIST*Low_Disclosure  
+ 6 Investor_rights_factor + 7 Liquidity_R + 8 Growth  
+ 9 ROA + 10 Global Industry q +       (3) 
 
We estimate equation (3) using both ordinary least squares and two-stage least 
squares models.  The latter specification controls for self-selection by considering the fact 
that the probability of listing is higher for firms with certain firm-level and country-level 
characteristics.  We use the other exogenous variables from the listing equation as 
instruments.  Since we model firm q as a function of other country and firm 
characteristics and the firm’s listing decision, the regression errors are likely to be 
associated with the firm’s listing decision, biasing the listing decision coefficient in the 
firm q model if we do not control for self-selection.  To estimate the first stage equation 
(i.e., the cross-listing choice model) in the two-stage models, we use the following model 
(4):  
XLIST      = 0 + 1 Disclosure + 2 Investor_rights_factor + 3 F_Law + 4 G_Law  
+ 5 S_Law + 6 Liquidity_R + 7 Log_GNP  
+ 8 Size + 9 Cap_Intensity + 10 Leverage  
+ 11 Turnover + 12 Debt_Issue + 13 Equity_Issue  
+ 14 Industry +          (4) 
 
 [Insert Table 10 about here] 
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As Doidge et al. (2004) note, an important issue in a self-selection model is to 
choose instrumental variables that are exogenous in the second-stage valuation equation.  
We do not include firm growth measures such as ROA and growth in assets in the first- 
and second-stage selection equations (i.e., equation (4)) at the same time for obvious 
econometric reasons. Because these firm growth proxies likely influence both the listing 
decisions and firm value, it is difficult to view them as exogenous instruments. However, 
untabulated result shows that including ROA and growth in assets in the second stage 
equation instead of the first stage equation does not change our inference.    
The results obtained from estimating regression equation (3) are presented in 
Table 10.  In the OLS regression, the coefficient on XLIST is significantly positive 
(p<0.01) suggesting that cross-listing firms receive a higher valuation than non cross-
listing firms.  The coefficient on XLIST*Low_Disclosure is negative (p=0.10), however, 
suggesting that the positive association between firms’ valuation and cross-listing 
decision is discounted in the subsample of firms from a lower disclosure regime.  The 
sum of the slope coefficients associated with XLIST and XLIST*Low_Disclosure is 0.056 
(0.138 minus 0.082), which suggests that the association between firms’ valuation and 
cross-listing decision is on average significantly positive but that the association is 
stronger for firms cross-listing from a higher disclosure regime. Similarly, the coefficient 
on ORG_EXC_XLIST in the OLS regression is significantly positive (p<0.01) suggesting 
that exchange-listing firms tend to receive a higher valuation than firms that do not list on 
an exchange.   
The 2SLS regressions show that the coefficient on XLIST remains significantly 
positive (p<0.05), again suggesting that the firms’ valuation is increasing in the cross-
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listing decision.  The coefficient on XLIST*Low_Disclosure becomes insignificant, 
suggesting that the disclosure level in the firms’ country of domicile does not materially 
affect the association between firms’ valuation and cross-listing decision after the effect 
of self-selection is controlled for.  In other words, after we control for the self-selection, 
cross-listing firms on average receive a higher valuation as compared with non cross-
listing firms, regardless of the disclosure level in the firms’ country of domicile. 
Firms that originate from a higher disclosure regime and that list on an organized 
exchange enjoy 0.369 higher Tobin’s q than the other firms included in the sample.  The 
coefficient on ORG_EXC_XLIST*Low_Disclosure is significantly negative (p<0.01), 
suggesting that exchange-listing firms from a lower disclosure regime receive a lower 
valuation than exchange-listing firms from a high disclosure regime.  In fact, the 
difference in Tobin’s q between exchange-listing firms from a higher disclosure regime 
and a lower disclosure regime is a rather large at 0.273.  The sum of the slope coefficients 
associated with ORG_EXC_XLIST and ORG_EXC_XLIST*Low_Disclosure suggests 
that, for exchange-listing firms originating from a lower disclosure regime, the 
association between firms’ valuation and exchange-listing decision is positive but with a 
smaller magnitude (statistically significant) as compared with the association for 
exchange-listing firms from a higher disclosure regime.33 
This finding departs from Hail and Leuz (2006b) who document that the cost of 
capital effect from listing on an organized exchange is observed only for firms domiciled 
in a low disclosure regime but not for firms in a high disclosure regime.  Their result, 
combined with ours, suggests that while the cost of capital effect might be larger for  
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exchange-listing firms from a low disclosure regime, firms from a high disclosure regime 
enjoy significant future cash flow benefit from listing on an organized exchange: as a 
consequence, the overall valuation benefit is larger (smaller) for exchange-listing firms 
from a high (low) disclosure regime.  
A possible explanation for the valuation difference among exchange-listing firms 
from high and low disclosure regimes is that investors have access to more information 
about exchange-listed firms than cross-listed firms that do not list on an exchange, as the 
former are more “visible,” i.e., receive more attention from the investment community in 
the form of more media and analyst coverage (e.g., Grant 1980).  Based on Merton 
(1987), it is also possible that firms domiciled in a lower disclosure regime are largely 
“neglected” by investors, resulting in a lower valuation.34   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The number of firms cross-listing in the United States has grown rapidly, from 
158 in 1990 to almost 2,000 in 2004.  Given such a rapid growth in the number of cross-
border listings, understanding the underlying motives for cross-listing is important for 
security regulators, accounting standard setters, corporate managers, and investors.  In 
this study, we examined the roles U.S. disclosure requirements play in firms’ choices of 
listing mode and how capital market participants evaluate such decisions.  Given the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33
 Our inferences do not change when we control for the endogeneity in exchange-listing instead of cross-
listing.  Our inferences also remain when we interact a dummy variable that captures whether the firm has 
raised capital after cross-listing with both ORG_EXC_LIST and ORG_EXC_LIST × Low_Disclosure. 
34
 Another possible interpretation is that since home country GAAP-based and U.S. GAAP-based 
accounting information are available for exchange-listing firms, the disclosure level difference between 
firms from higher and lower disclosure regimes persists even after the exchange-listing.  Given that: (1) 
U.S. GAAP compliance uniformly enhances firms’ disclosure levels; and (2) both U.S. GAAP and home 
country GAAP information are available to investors after the compliance, it is possible that the difference 
in the disclosure levels between firms from high and those from low disclosure regimes still exists for 
exchange-listing firms.                                                                        
 30    
opposing forces that could influence managers’ decisions to increase disclosure, i.e., 
desires to maintain private control benefits and to increase the public value of the firm, 
the outcome was not obvious a priori.  
Supporting the agency theory perspective, our evidence suggests that firms are 
less likely to subject themselves to the stricter disclosure environment when greater loss 
of private control benefits from such an action is anticipated.  Firms domiciled in a 
weaker disclosure environment (where disclosure of conflict of interest, i.e., information 
that might affect managers’ private control benefits, is often not mandated) are less likely 
to cross-list on an organized exchange where they are required to comply with U.S. 
GAAP and to release sensitive corporate governance-related information such as 
executive remuneration, board composition, share ownership, and related party 
transactions.35       
Our pricing tests show that exchange-listing firms tend to receive a higher 
valuation than non exchange-listing firms.  We further find that exchange-listing firms 
from a lower disclosure regime receive less benefit (in terms of valuation) than exchange-
listing firms from a higher disclosure regime, despite the fact that the cost of cross-listing 
is likely to be higher for firms from a lower disclosure regime.  Taken together, our 
evidence suggests that the valuation benefit from listing on an organized exchange is 
lower for firms from a weaker disclosure environment and thus these firms are less likely 
to list on an organized exchange.  Furthermore, the negative association between the 
likelihood of cross-listing on an organized exchange and the extensiveness of disclosure 
requirements in the firm’s country of domicile lends support to the idea that managers in  
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these firms, who are likely to give up larger amount of control benefits by complying 
with U.S. disclosure requirements relative to managers of firms domiciled in stronger 
disclosure environments, are more reluctant to commit to the increased disclosure.    
Potential caveats of this study include the following.  It is possible that a firm’s 
decision to cross-list on an organized exchange and to conform to U.S. GAAP might be 
influenced by the difference between its home country GAAP earnings and U.S. GAAP 
earnings.  For instance, a firm that would report lower earnings under U.S. GAAP than 
under local GAAP might be less likely to report U.S. GAAP earnings in order to avoid a 
decline in the stock price.  Our tests do not consider this possibility because doing this 
would require “as-if” U.S GAAP earnings figures for those that do not comply with U.S. 
GAAP.   
We acknowledge that the CIFAR country-level disclosure scores used in the main 
analysis, although widely used in the literature (and in particular used by the studies that 
we benchmark our results against), are somewhat outdated. The firm-level analysis using 
more recent S&P scores complements the use of country-level disclosure scores, but it 
comes at the cost of reduced sample size as the S&P scores are available only for a 
limited number of firms.  
While our evidence suggests that the valuation benefit from an exchange-listing is 
lower for firms domiciled in a lower disclosure regime, our evidence does not tell us why 
this is the case.  Some possible explanations for why exchange-listing firms from a lower 
disclosure regime receive a lower valuation compared with firms from a higher disclosure 
regime, not explored in this study, are that: (1) disclosure level difference persists even 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which applies to Level II and Level III ADRs starting 2005, will 
provide an interesting setting to examine whether and how firms’ decisions to comply with the U.S. 
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after complying with U.S. accounting rules and regulations because home country GAAP 
accounting information continues to be available; (2) investors do not fully appreciate the 
fact that all exchange-listing firms are subject to the same disclosure requirements by 
complying with U.S. GAAP; or that (3) investors underestimate the future cash-flow 
growth opportunities of exchange-listing firms from a lower disclosure regime.  We leave 
these for future research.  
 Finally, a cross-listing firm’s cost of complying with U.S. GAAP is likely to be 
highest in the initial year and lower once the firm is more familiar with the reconciliation 
process.  Thus, it is possible that the contrast between the benefits of listing on an 
organized exchange (i.e., better access to capital, lower cost of capital, and higher name 
recognition) and the cost of complying with U.S. accounting rules and regulations is 
likely the most pronounced in the initial year of listing.  As most of our sample firms are 
not in the initial year of their listing, it is unlikely that this has biased our results.36           
                                                                                                                                                                             
disclosure requirements are affected.     
36
 Over 92% of our sample firms were not in their initial year of listing.  Furthermore, our main findings do 
not change if we include the number of years of U.S. listing in the regression models. 
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Table 1 
Sample Construction 
 
 
  
Non-US firms in the Global Vantage Database in year 2000 14,787  
  
(-) Total assets in year 2000 less than 100 million US$ (5,137) 
 
 
(-) Firms that have missing control variables  (2,538) 
 
 
(-) Firms in the countries where any country-level variables are not available (914) 
  
Number of sample firms 6,198 
  
  
Listing status of sample firms as of Dec. 31, 2000 
 
  
        Total Non Cross-listing firms 5,454 
  
                             Listed on NYSE 205 
  
                             Listed on AMEX/NASDAQ   64 
  
                             Traded on OTC       343 
                                            
                             Traded under Rule 144a/Regulation S 132 
  
        Total Cross-listing firms     744 
  
        Total Sample firms 6,198 
 
 









Some of the sample firms traded on an organized exchange (NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ) also have shares 
traded OTC or listed under Rule 144a/Regulation S. The number of firms traded on OTC and Rule 
144a/Regulation S does not include firms that are also listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. 
 37    
Table 2 
Distributions by Country and Listing Type 
 
 
Non cross-listed  
firms 
Exchange listed 
firms 
(NYSE/AMEX 
/NASDAQ) 
OTC/Rule144a/ 
Reg.S firms Total  
Country 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Argentina 12 0.2 8 3.0 3 0.6 23 0.4 
Australia 130 2.4 10 3.7 20 4.2 160 2.6 
Austria 48 0.9 0 0 10 2.1 58 0.9 
Belgium 54 1.0 1 0.4 2 0.4 57 0.9 
Brazil 55 1.0 14 5.2 15 3.2 84 1.4 
Chile 49 0.9 15 5.6 1 0.2 65 1.1 
Colombia 12 0.2 1 0.4 3 0.6 16 0.3 
Denmark 68 1.3 3 1.1 1 0.2 72 1.2 
Finland 44 0.8 5 1.9 3 0.6 52 0.8 
France 249 4.6 20 7.4 15 3.2 284 4.6 
Germany 261 4.8 11 4.1 15 3.2 287 4.6 
Greece 31 0.6 3 1.1 2 0.4 36 0.6 
Hong Kong 87 1.6 1 0.4 44 9.3 132 2.1 
India 106 2.0 8 3.0 37 7.8 151 2.5 
Ireland 19 0.4 1 0.4 3 0.6 23 0.4 
Israel 25 0.5 4 1.5 1 0.2 30 0.5 
Italy 119 2.2 5 1.9 9 1.9 133 2.2 
Japan 2242 41.2 29 10.8 106 22.3 2377 38.4 
Korea 75 1.4 4 1.5 12 2.5 91 1.5 
Malaysia 233 4.3 0 0 6 1.3 239 3.9 
Mexico 15 0.3 14 5.2 16 3.4 45 0.7 
Netherlands 77 1.4 19 7.1 7 1.5 103 1.7 
New Zealand 27 0.5 3 1.1 0 0 30 0.5 
Norway 40 0.7 3 1.1 7 1.5 50 0.8 
Pakistan 28 0.5 0 0 2 0.4 30 0.5 
Philippines 55 1.0 1 0.4 8 1.7 64 1.0 
Portugal 20 0.4 1 0.4 3 0.6 24 0.4 
Singapore 121 2.2 0 0 14 3.0 135 2.2 
South Africa 66 1.2 6 2.2 20 4.2 92 1.5 
Spain 81 1.5 5 1.9 4 0.8 90 1.5 
Sweden 75 1.4 8 3.0 4 0.8 87 1.4 
Switzerland 81 1.5 3 1.1 0 0 84 1.4 
Taiwan 121 2.2 5 1.9 28 5.9 154 2.5 
Thailand 97 1.8 0 0 10 2.1 107 1.7 
Turkey 25 0.5 0 0 5 1.1 30 0.5 
United Kingdom 606 11.1 58 21.6 39 8.2 703 11.3 
Total 5454 100.0 269 100.0 475 100.0 6198 100.0 
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Table 3 
Variable Definitions 
 
Disclosure  
Index of Accounting disclosure level measured by the 1995 CIFAR. The index is 
created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports for their inclusion and 
exclusion of 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 and 100 as the highest standard; 
Anti_Director  
Index that aggregates six different shareholder rights and ranges in value from 0 to 6 
with 6 as the highest level of protection for minority shareholders. Data are from LLSV 
(1998) and Doidge et al. (2004); 
Jud_Efficiency  
Index of the efficiency and integrity of legal environment measured by Business 
International Corporation, LLSV (1998) and Doidge et al. (2004).  It ranges from 1 to 10 
with 10 as the highest level of efficiency; 
E_Law  1 if the firm is from an English common law system country, and 0 otherwise; 
F_Law  1 if the firm is from a French code law system country, and 0 otherwise; 
G_Law  1 if the firm is from a German code law system country, and 0 otherwise; 
S_Law  1 if the firm is from a Scandinavian code law system country, and 0 otherwise; 
Liquidity_R  
Liquidity of capital market in the country estimated by the ratio of the dollar value of 
shares traded by the average market capitalization in 1997.  This information is from 
IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1998 and 1999; 
Log_GNP  Log of GNP (1997) in billions of U.S. dollars in the country. Data are from IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1998 and 1999; 
Tobin’s q  (Total assets – Book equity + Market value of equity)/Total assets 
Low_Disclosure  1 if the CIFAR index score of the firm’s country of domicile is below the global median (i.e., 72.5), and 0 otherwise; 
Listing_R  
3 if the firm is able to meet three major stock exchanges’ (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ)  
threshold quantitative listing requirements on market cap, stockholders' equity, net 
tangible assets, and earnings as of December 31, 2000, 2 if the firm is able to meet two 
of three exchanges’ requirements, 1 if one, and 0 otherwise; 
Size  Log of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars as of year 2000 end; 
Growth  36-month change in total assets as of year 2000 end; 
ROA  Return on assets (net income / average total assets) for year 2000; 
Cap_Intensity  Capital intensity (fixed assets / total assets) as of year 2000 end; 
Leverage  Financial leverage (total long-term debt / total assets) as of year 2000 end; 
Turnover  Asset turnover (revenue / average total assets) for year 2000; 
Debt_Issue  Change in the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt for year 2000; 
Equity_Issue  Change in the common shares and share premium for year 2000; 
Global Industry q  The global average of the industry median Tobin’s q as of year 2000. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Description of country-level variables 
 
Country Disclo-
sure 
Anti- 
Director 
rights 
Judicial 
Efficien
cy 
English 
law 
French 
law 
German 
law 
Scandin
avian 
law 
Liqui- 
dity 
ratio 
GNP 
Argentina 68 4 6.00 0 1 0 0 0.50 319.3 
Australia 80 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.52 382.7 
Austria 62 2 9.50 0 0 1 0 0.71 225.4 
Belgium 68 0 9.50 0 1 0 0 0.23 272.4 
Brazil 56 3 5.75 0 1 0 0 0.86 784.0 
Chile 78 5 7.25 0 1 0 0 0.11 70.5 
Colombia 58 3 7.25 0 1 0 0 0.10 87.1 
Denmark 75 2 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.57 184.4 
Finland 83 3 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.53 127.4 
France 78 3 8.00 0 1 0 0 0.64 1541.6 
Germany 67 1 9.00 0 0 1 0 1.38 2321.0 
Greece 61 2 7.00 0 1 0 0 0.73 122.4 
Hong Kong 73 5 10.00 1 0 0 0 1.13 163.8 
India 61 5 8.00 1 0 0 0 0.43 357.4 
Ireland 81 4 8.75 1 0 0 0 0.83 65.1 
Israel 74 3 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.26 94.4 
Italy 66 1 6.75 0 1 0 0 0.66 95.4 
Japan 71 4 10.00 0 0 1 0 0.46 4812.1 
Korea 68 2 6.00 0 0 1 0 1.88 485.2 
Malaysia 79 4 9.00 1 0 0 0 0.73 98.2 
Mexico 71 1 6.00 0 1 0 0 0.38 348.6 
Netherlands 74 2 10.00 0 1 0 0 0.67 403.1 
New Zealand 80 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.38 59.5 
Norway 75 4 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.75 159.0 
Pakistan 73 5 5.00 1 0 0 0 1.06 64.6 
Philippines 64 3 4.75 0 1 0 0 0.35 88.4 
Portugal 56 3 5.50 0 1 0 0 0.66 109.5 
Singapore 79 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.50 101.8 
South Africa 79 5 6.00 1 0 0 0 0.19 130.2 
Spain 72 4 6.25 0 1 0 0 1.70 569.6 
Sweden 83 3 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.68 231.9 
Switzerland 80 2 10.00 0 0 1 0 1.01 305.2 
Taiwan 58 3 6.75 0 0 1 0 4.62 292.6 
Thailand 66 2 3.25 1 0 0 0 0.38 165.8 
Turkey 58 2 4.00 0 1 0 0 1.30 199.31 
United 
Kingdom 85 5 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.44 1231.3 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Comparison between cross-listed firms and non cross-listed firms 
 
 
All sample firms 
(N=6,198) 
Cross-listed firms 
(N=744) 
Non cross-listed 
firms (N=5,454) 
Test of  Differences 
(cross-listed vs. non 
cross-listed) 
 
Variables 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Disclosure 72.897 71.000 72.251 71.000 72.985 71.000     **     
Anti_Director 3.611 4.000 3.613 4.000 3.611 4.000           
Jud_Efficiency 9.042 10.000 8.538 10.000 9.110 10.000     ***     +++ 
E_Law 0.296 0 0.386 0 0.283 0     ***     +++ 
F_Law 0.170 0 0.269 0 0.157 0     ***     +++ 
G_Law 0.492 0 0.300 0 0.519 1.000     ***     +++ 
S_Law 0.042 0 0.046 0 0.042 0        
Liquidity_R 0.703 0.460 0.799 0.460 0.690 0.460     ***      
Log_GNP 6.923 7.116 6.385 5.999 7.000 7.341     ***     +++ 
Size 6.596 6.258 8.026 8.150 6.401 6.095     ***     +++ 
Growth 0.251 0.100 0.341 0.173 0.239 0.095     ***     +++ 
ROA 0.026 0.018 0.038 0.030 0.024 0.017     ***     +++ 
Cap_Intensity 0.292 0.270 0.319 0.297 0.289 0.268     ***     +++ 
Leverage 0.133 0.102 0.169 0.147 0.128 0.095     ***     +++ 
Turnover 0.824 0.766 0.732 0.686 0.836 0.777     ***     +++ 
Debt_Issue 0.111 0.001 0.209 0.037 0.098 -0.001     ***     +++ 
Equity_Issue 0.045 0 0.077 0.002 0.040 0     ***     +++ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, *      The difference between means is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
+++, ++, +    The difference between medians using Wilcoxon rank-sum scores is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1  
                      level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel C: Comparison between exchange-listed firms and non exchange-listed firms 
 
 
All cross-listed firms 
(N=744) 
Exchange-listed firms 
(N=269) 
Non exchange-listed 
firms (N=475) 
Test of  Differences 
(exchange-listed vs. 
non exchange-listed) 
 
Variables 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Disclosure 72.251 71.000 74.669 75.000 70.882 71.000     ***     +++ 
Anti_Director 3.613 4.000 3.520 4.000 3.665 4.000           
Jud_Efficiency 8.538 10.000 8.624 10.000 8.489 10.000          
E_Law 0.386 0 0.338 0 0.413 0     **     ++ 
F_Law 0.269 0 0.398 0 0.196 0     ***     +++ 
G_Law 0.300 0 0.193 0 0.360 0     ***     +++ 
S_Law 0.046 0 0.071 0 0.032 0     **     ++ 
Liquidity_R 0.799 0.460 0.660 0.460 0.877 0.460     ***     ++ 
Log_GNP 6.385 5.999 6.403 6.345 6.375 5.879   
Listing_R 1.914 2.000 2.275 3.000 1.709 2.000     ***     +++ 
Size 8.026 8.150 8.444 8.704 7.790 7.840     ***     +++ 
Growth 0.341 0.173 0.433 0.223 0.289 0.136     **     + 
ROA 0.038 0.030 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.027     **     ++ 
Cap_Intensity 0.319 0.297 0.312 0.267 0.323 0.309       
Leverage 0.169 0.147 0.173 0.152 0.166 0.146       
Turnover 0.732 0.686 0.702 0.641 0.750 0.717   
Debt_Issue 0.209 0.037 0.249 0.084 0.186 0.025   
Equity_Issue 0.077 0.002 0.124 0.018 0.050 0.001     ***     +++ 
 
 
 
***, **, *     The difference between means is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
+++, ++, +    The difference between medians using Wilcoxon rank-sum scores is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1  
                      level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel D: Correlation Matrix 
 
    Anti_ Jud_   Liquidity  Log_       Cap_     Debt_ Equity_ Tobin’s  
  Disclosure Director Efficiency _R GNP Size Growth ROA Intensity Leverage Turnover Issue Issue  q 
Disclosure   0.79*** 0.62*** -0.04 0.23 0.14 0.65*** 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.25 0.45** 0.51** 0.56*** 
Anti_Director 0.44***   0.72*** -0.09 0.55*** -0.06 0.49** 0.05 0.26 0.21 0.44** 0.29 0.36 0.34 
Jud_Efficiency 0.45*** 0.36***   -0.09 0.78*** 0.03*** 0.11 -0.15 0.15 -0.05 0.61*** -0.02 0.04 0.23 
Liquidity_R -0.39*** -0.28*** -0.32***   0.20 0.70 0.36 0.09 0.46** 0.41* 0.23 0.40* 0.24 0.27 
Log_GNP -0.07*** 0.20*** 0.51*** -0.19***   0.16 0.01 -0.34 0.39* 0.00 0.71*** 0.00 -0.03 0.13 
Size -0.05*** -0.13*** -0.05*** 0.08*** 0.00   0.38* 0.05 0.17 0.56*** 0.02 0.45** 0.22 0.39* 
Growth 0.12*** 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.05*** -0.15*** 0.02   0.63*** 0.12 0.38* 0.21 0.88*** 0.92*** 0.77*** 
ROA 0.10*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.03** -0.20*** -0.05*** 0.20***   -0.12 0.06 0.15 0.63*** 0.74*** 0.76*** 
Cap_Intensity -0.11*** 0.04*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.13*** -0.03** -0.01   0.31 0.47** 0.22 -0.01 0.00 
Leverage 0.03*** -0.02 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.34***   -0.25 0.45** 0.22 0.16 
Turnover 0.01 0.03** 0.14*** -0.07*** 0.23*** -0.26*** 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.10*** -0.13***   0.24 0.23 0.44** 
Debt_Issue 0.06*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.03** -0.12*** 0.05*** 0.35*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.12*** 0.13***   0.87*** 0.74*** 
Equity_Issue 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.04*** 0.40*** 0.09*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.32***   0.80*** 
Tobin's q 0.05*** -0.02 -0.02* -0.03** -0.03** 0.04*** 0.21*** 0.37*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.10***   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the Pearson (lower triangle) and the Spearman (upper triangle) correlations between key variables. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the 
significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level. Refer to Table3 for variable definitions.  
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Table 5 
Logit Regressions of Cross-Listing  
(N=6,198) 
 
 
Logit models 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept       1.420*** 
       (0.00) 
      -3.410*** 
      (0.00) 
      -3.891*** 
      (0.00) 
      -3.298*** 
      (0.00) 
Disclosure      -0.045*** 
        (0.00) 
     -0.062*** 
      (0.00) 
      -0.028*** 
      (0.00) 
      -0.063*** 
      (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor       0.058 
      (0.23) 
       0.173*** 
      (0.00) 
       0.193*** 
      (0.00) 
       0.179*** 
      (0.00) 
F_Law      -0.046 
      (0.72) 
      -0.527*** 
      (0.00)  
      -0.641*** 
      (0.00) 
G_Law      -1.211*** 
      (0.00) 
      -1.857*** 
      (0.00)  
      -1.958*** 
      (0.00) 
S_Law       -0.150     
      (0.45) 
      -0.496** 
      (0.02)  
      -0.828*** 
      (0.00) 
Liquidity_R         0.187*** 
      (0.00) 
      -0.037 
      (0.53) 
       0.123* 
      (0.07) 
Log_GNP        -0.016 
      (0.78) 
      -0.405*** 
      (0.00) 
      -0.142** 
      (0.02) 
Size         0.795*** 
      (0.00) 
       0.766*** 
      (0.00) 
       1.083*** 
      (0.00) 
Cap_Intensity          -0.086 
      (0.76) 
Leverage           0.143 
      (0.72) 
Turnover           0.012   
      (0.91) 
Debt_Issue           0.057 
      (0.48) 
Equity_Issue           0.072 
      (0.68) 
Industry    Included 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.291 0.262 0.380 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is XLIST, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm cross-lists in the United States, and zero otherwise.  ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively (two-tailed).  Refer to Table 3 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 6 
Logit Regressions of Exchange-Listing  
(N=744) 
 
Logit models 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept  -7.707*** 
   (0.00) 
  -9.686*** 
   (0.00) 
 -9.182*** 
   (0.00) 
 -8.186*** 
   (0.00) 
Disclosure   0.083*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.071*** 
   (0.00) 
  0.067*** 
   (0.00) 
  0.075*** 
   (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor   0.071 
   (0.50) 
   0.008 
   (0.94) 
  0.027 
   (0.82) 
 -0.001 
   (0.99) 
F_Law   1.806*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.527*** 
   (0.00) 
  1.507*** 
   (0.00) 
  1.726*** 
   (0.00) 
G_Law   0.394 
   (0.11) 
  -0.316 
   (0.38) 
 -0.254 
   (0.48) 
 -0.202 
   (0.60) 
S_Law   0.892** 
   (0.02) 
   0.893** 
   (0.02) 
  0.572 
   (0.15) 
  0.624 
   (0.14) 
Liquidity_R     0.127 
   (0.38) 
  0.127 
   (0.40) 
 -0.077 
   (0.64) 
Log_GNP     0.125    
   (0.23) 
  0.065    
   (0.53) 
  0.064  
   (0.57)   
Listing_R     0.323*** 
   (0.00) 
  0.299*** 
   (0.00) 
Size     0.323*** 
   (0.00) 
  0.246*** 
   (0.00) 
  0.284*** 
   (0.00) 
Cap_Intensity     -0.001 
   (0.99) 
Leverage      0.498 
   (0.53) 
Turnover     -0.201 
   (0.40) 
Debt_Issue     -0.003 
   (0.98) 
Equity_Issue      0.603* 
   (0.06) 
Industry    Included 
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.225 0.246 0.326 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is ORG_EXC_XLIST, an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the firm cross-lists on an organized exchange in the United States, and zero otherwise.  ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed).  Refer 
to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 
Weighted Logit Regressions of Cross-Listing and Exchange-Listing  
 
The dependent variable in the cross-listing regressions, XLIST, is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm cross-lists in the United States, and zero otherwise.  In the exchange-listing regressions, the dependent variable is 
ORG_EXC_XLIST, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm cross-lists on an organized exchange in 
the United States, and zero otherwise.  ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 
level, respectively (two-tailed).  Refer to Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Cross-Listing 
Regression 
(N=6,198) 
Exchange-Listing 
Regression 
(N=744)  
Variables (1) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept   -4.456*** 
   (0.00) 
  -4.999*** 
   (0.00) 
 -10.527*** 
   (0.00) 
 -11.184*** 
   (0.00) 
Disclosure   -0.026*** 
   (0.00) 
  -0.033*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.083*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.110*** 
   (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor    0.063 
   (0.14) 
   0.096** 
   (0.03) 
   0.380*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.411*** 
   (0.00) 
F_Law   -0.088 
   (0.44) 
  -0.150 
   (0.21) 
   2.185*** 
   (0.00) 
   2.988*** 
   (0.00) 
G_Law   -1.075*** 
   (0.00) 
  -1.177*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.450*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.837*** 
   (0.00) 
S_Law   -0.461 
   (0.00) 
  -0.646*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.571* 
   (0.06) 
   0.542*  
   (0.09) 
Liquidity_R     0.020 
   (0.74) 
  -0.012 
   (0.84) 
  -0.218 
   (0.25) 
  -0.456** 
   (0.03) 
Log_GNP     0.058 
   (0.17) 
  -0.012 
   (0.79) 
  -0.279*** 
   (0.01) 
  -0.269** 
   (0.02) 
Listing_R      0.395*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.379*** 
   (0.00) 
Size    0.618*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.853*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.226*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.295*** 
   (0.00) 
Cap_Intensity     0.959*** 
   (0.00)  
   0.009 
   (0.98) 
Leverage     0.280  
   (0.38)  
   1.113 
   (0.18) 
Turnover     0.213** 
   (0.02)  
  -0.146 
   (0.58) 
Debt_Issue    -0.184*** 
   (0.00)  
  -0.289* 
   (0.07) 
Equity_Issue     0.132 
   (0.32)  
   0.974*** 
   (0.00) 
Industry  Included  Included 
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.283 0.286 0.419 
 43    
Table 8 
When S& P Firm-Level Disclosure Measures are used to Proxy for Disclosure Level 
 
 
 
In the cross-listing regression, the dependent variable in these regressions is XLIST, an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm cross-lists in the United States, and zero otherwise.  In the exchange-
listing regression, the dependent variable is ORG_EXC_XLIST, an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm cross-lists on an organized exchange in the United States, and zero otherwise.  ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively (two-tailed).  
Disclosure (S&P) refers to S&P firm-level disclosure scores.  Refer to Table 3 for other variable 
definitions.   
 
Cross-Listing 
Matched Regression 
(N=642) 
 
 
Exchange-Listing 
Matched Regression 
(N=345) 
 
 
Variables 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept                  -4.087*** 
                  (0.00) 
                -5.215*** 
                 (0.00) 
Disclosure (S&P)                  -0.002 
                  (0.79) 
                 0.045*** 
                 (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor                   0.168* 
                  (0.09) 
                 0.054 
                 (0.73) 
F_Law                   0.035 
                  (0.91) 
                 2.348*** 
                 (0.00) 
G_Law                  -0.344 
                  (0.33) 
                -0.092 
                 (0.86) 
S_Law                  -0.400 
                  (0.41) 
                 1.025 
                 (0.14) 
Liquidity_R                   0.322** 
                  (0.03) 
                 0.145 
                 (0.50) 
Log_GNP                  -0.110 
                  (0.36) 
                 0.165 
                 (0.36) 
Listing_R                   0.107  
                 (0.51) 
Size                   0.528*** 
                  (0.00) 
                 0.174 
                 (0.19) 
Cap_Intensity                   0.392 
                  (0.48) 
                 0.478 
                 (0.56) 
Leverage                   0.464 
                  (0.54) 
                 0.447 
                 (0.71) 
Turnover                  -0.248 
                  (0.36) 
                -0.376 
                 (0.39) 
Debt_Issue                   0.336** 
                  (0.03) 
                -0.006 
                 (0.98) 
Equity_Issue                   0.166 
                  (0.51) 
                 0.620* 
                 (0.09) 
Industry                  Included                 Included 
Pseudo R2                   0.188                  0.357 
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Table 9 
Multinomial Logit Regressions of Cross-listing Choice: A Comparison among Non-
Cross-Listing, Cross-Listing on a Non-Exchange, and Exchange Listing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this part of analysis, firms traded on OTC/Rule 144a/Reg.S (CL_NEL) are treated as the reference 
group.  ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively 
(two-tailed).  Refer to Table 3 for variable definitions.  
  
 
 
                                                   Number of obs.:      6,198 
                                                   Wald 2 (52):       1551.83 
                                                   Prob > 2 :                 0.00 
                                                   Log Likelihood: -1985.57 
                                                   Pseudo R2:                0.28 
Non Cross-Listed (NCL) Exchange-Listed (EL)  
Variables Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept                     1.288* 
                    (0.09) 
                -8.133*** 
                 (0.00) 
Disclosure                     0.089*** 
                    (0.00)       
                 0.081*** 
                 (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor                    -1.197*** 
                    (0.01) 
                -0.068 
                 (0.59) 
F_Law                     1.148*** 
                    (0.00) 
                 1.399*** 
                 (0.00) 
G_Law                     1.831*** 
                    (0.00) 
                -0.054 
                 (0.89) 
S_Law                     1.164*** 
                    (0.00) 
                 0.801** 
                 (0.05) 
Liquidity_R                    -0.084 
                    (0.25) 
                -0.104 
                 (0.50) 
Log_GNP                     0.203*** 
                    (0.01) 
                 0.081 
                 (0.44) 
Listing_R                     0.017 
                    (0.75) 
                 0.152* 
                 (0.08) 
Size                    -1.002*** 
                    (0.00) 
                 0.255*** 
                 (0.00) 
Cap_Intensity                     0.048 
                    (0.88) 
                 0.156 
                 (0.75) 
Leverage                    -0.123 
                    (0.79) 
                 0.027 
                 (0.97) 
Turnover                    -0.136 
                    (0.29) 
                -0.318 
                 (0.12) 
Debt_Issue                    -0.069 
                    (0.46) 
                -0.008 
                 (0.95) 
Equity_Issue                     0.188 
                    (0.38) 
                 0.069** 
                 (0.03) 
Industry Included Included 
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Table 10 
Valuation Impact of Cross-listing and Exchange-listing 
(N=6,198, Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q) 
 
 
OLS  2SLS 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept   -0.095 
   (0.16)  
  -0.106 
   (0.12) 
  -0.106 
   (0.12) 
  -0.098 
   (0.15) 
  -0.103 
   (0.13) 
XLIST    0.138*** 
   (0.00)  
   0.279*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.334*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.161*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.134** 
   (0.03) 
ORG_EXC_XLIST    0.283*** 
   (0.00)    
   0.255*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.369*** 
   (0.00) 
Low_Disclosure   -0.022 
   (0.14)  
  -0.039*** 
   (0.01) 
  -0.027 
   (0.12) 
  -0.035** 
   (0.01) 
  -0.029* 
   (0.08) 
XLIST × Low_Disclosure   -0.082* 
   (0.10)   
  -0.109 
   (0.16)  
   0.055 
   (0.51) 
ORG_EXC_XLIST ×  
Low_Disclosure 
  -0.178** 
   (0.02)       
  -0.273*** 
   (0.00) 
Investor_rights_factor    0.009 
   (0.14)  
   0.013** 
   (0.04) 
   0.012* 
   (0.07) 
   0.014** 
   (0.03) 
   0.013** 
   (0.04) 
Liquidity_R   -0.043*** 
   (0.00)  
  -0.047*** 
   (0.00) 
  -0.047*** 
   (0.00) 
  -0.044*** 
   (0.00) 
  -0.044*** 
   (0.00) 
Growth    0.098*** 
   (0.00)  
   0.095*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.096*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.096*** 
   (0.00) 
   0.096*** 
   (0.00) 
ROA    3.980*** 
   (0.00)  
   3.992*** 
   (0.00) 
   4.000*** 
   (0.00) 
   3.960*** 
   (0.00) 
   3.983*** 
   (0.00) 
Global Industry q    1.074*** 
   (0.00)  
   1.062*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.063*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.049*** 
   (0.00) 
   1.054*** 
   (0.00) 
R2 0.238  0.229 0.229 0.236 0.238 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in these regressions is Tobin’s q.  XLIST is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the firm cross-lists in the United States, and zero otherwise.  ORG_EXC_XLIST is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm cross-lists on an organized exchange in the United States, 
and zero otherwise.  The 2SLS regressions are the second stage regression results.  ***, **, * indicate that 
the coefficient is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively (two-tailed).  Refer to Table 3 for 
variable definitions. 
 
 
